The Threat to Armed Forces in Un-Conventional Operations

1. INTRODUCTION.

The Threat – and what can be done about it

Most national armed forces are structured and equipped for a conventional war and follow doctrines prepared for use in a conventional war scenario. Increasingly, however, armed forces are required to engage in low or medium intensity combat against insurgents, terrorists or guerilla forces, who generally avoid open conflict against a technologically superior enemy, preferring instead to employ un-conventional means of waging war.

Throughout the last quarter of a century the threat of attack from terrorists and insurgents operating on a non-linear battlefield has become increasingly common and the term 'asymmetric threat' is now much favoured in the media. However, the asymmetric threat is not new, nor is the degree of attention accorded to it, although defining the asymmetric threat is often done in different ways. Generally, it is used to describe a method of combat which is unconventional, favours the unexpected, attacks vulnerable points and makes it hard to establish an effective set of counter-measures. That definition is certainly relevant to the majority of the counter-insurgency operation currently being undertaken by armed forces in a number of areas.

During the 1970’s and 1980’s, South African and Rhodesian (now Zimbabwean) Armed Forces were waging an unconventional war across the region. Regular army patrols were confronted every day by ambushes, minefields and other explosive devices and, of course, their vehicles were under real threat from the ubiquitous RPG 7. Offensive operations against insurgents trained, armed and advised by a number of external states and operating in terrain that favoured them, required innovative tactics if they were to succeed. A number of lessons were learned, including the requirement for increased vehicle protection against blast weapons and the need for the close co-operation of all-arms to reduce the high attrition rates of the early years in both vehicles and men.

To protect troops and vehicles a number of modifications were developed to counter the serious threat of mines and RPGs. This paper suggests that today, when the RPG and the improvised explosive device (IED) remain the enemy's weapons of choice, the solutions have as much merit as they did in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

This white paper provides an overview of today’s holistic approach to protection, reviews today’s threats and proposes how current vehicle technology can neutralise them.

2. KEY DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS

Although not the focus of this paper, the elements currently used to counter the threat have some impact on vehicle design and are summarised below:

Predict / Prevent:

·         • Social Networking and Analysis Tools

·         • Dynamic Network Modelling Tools

·         • Tagging, Tracking, & Locating

·         • Technologies

·         • Detection of Pre-Emplacement Activity

·         • Persistent Surveillance

·         • Technologies

·         • Sensor and Data Exploitation Methods (AtN)

Detect:

·         • Command Wire Detection

·         • Buried IED Detection

·         • Detection of Pressure

·         • Initiation Devices

·         • Standoff Explosives Detection

·         • EFP (Explosively Formed Penetrator) Detection

·         • Sensor and Data Exploitation Methods (DtD)

Neutralize:

·         • PIR Defeat

·         • Blasting Cap Defeat

·         • CREW 3.3 S&T Electronic Warfare

Mitigate:

·         • Medical

·         • Vehicle and Crew Protection

·         • Dismounted Personnel Protection

3. THE SURVIVABILITY ONION - HOW TO MITIGATE THREATS

When considering the mitigation function, system engineering allows a more holistic approach to survivability in threat denial.  Each function identified by the onion has an impact on doctrine, operational structures and vehicle design.

Don’t Be Seen:

·         • signature reduction against all sensors

·         • camouflage

·         • stealth operations (silent watch)

·         • emission control (EMCON)

·         • blackout driving aids

·         • screening obscurants

·         • threat avoidance via situational awareness, mobility/agility

·         • rapid entry/exit speed

Don’t Be Acquired:

·         • screening obscurants

·         • active countermeasures

·         • move to sanctuary

Don’t Be Hit:

·         • warning sensors, laser and radar

·         • suppressive fire

·         • screening obscurants

·         • maneuver/move to sanctuary

·         • shot detection

·         • active countermeasures

·         • Active Protection System (APS)

Don’t Be Penetrated:

·         • armour (various types)

·         • contour/shaping

Don’t Be Killed:

·         • spall liners

·         • compartment fuel and ordinance

·         • local crew protection

·         • fire suppression

·         • easy egress

·         • run flat tires for escape

·         • self seal fuel, fluids

• rapid entry/exit speed

Fundamental system engineering principals depict the highest level functional allocation as shown in the diagram in the PDF.  All the functions identified above are allocated as sub level functions of the main functions and are directly responsible for the resulting design.

4. WHAT ARE THE THREATS?

Current arena threats can be grouped in the following categories:

4.1 Buried Mines

Buried ordinance can take the form of many different devices.  The prevalence of the conventional anti tank mine and more recently artillery shells has diminished as the availability of these devices declined.

The production of home-made explosives is becoming more common and the degree of lethality greater. This emphasizes the need for more creative solutions to preempt an attack or locate the device before it can be detonated.

4.2 RPGs

The RPG threat is ever present, particularly in an urban environment where ranges are short and vehicles unable to travel at speed. These weapons are readily available and easy to transport and conceal.  Warhead development is constantly evolving to overmatch the protection suites available. Situational awareness and the ability to attack the threat are crucial.

4.3 Ballistic

In the urban environment, smaller caliber weapons with API ammunition are prevalent. However attack with 50 Caliber and 14,5 have been reported.  The international standard STANAG 4569 is widely used to design against ballistic threats and is well defined as can be seen in the diagram in the PDF:

4.4 Surface IEDs – Improvised Explosive Devices

IEDs as the name suggests vary greatly in sophistication and lethality.

Blast and fragment threats

Homemade munitions, as illustrated below, embedded with numerous types of projectiles can be planted along the roadside and detonated with timers or by remote control.

Larger threats using artillery munitions are placed along the roadside at specific elevations to maximize...

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